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REPORTS.

-ADJOINING LAND OWNERS.

In Adams v. Betz, 78 N. E., 649, the Supreme Court
of Indiana decides tht where owners of adj oining premises establish by agreement a boundary line,
Boundaries
and take and hold possession of their respective lands and improve the same in accordance with such
boundary, each owner in the absence of fraud is estopped
from asserting that the boundary so agreed upon is not
the true boundary though the period of time which has
elapsed since the line was established and possession
taken is less than the statutory period of limitation.
Compare St. Bede College v. Weber, 168 Illinois, 324.
BILLS AND NOTES.

An interesting decision by the English King's Bench
Division appears in Macbeth v. North and South Wales
Bank, L. R. (19o6) 2 K. B.., 718, where it
Forged
n

tictitiou,
appeared that W. by falsely representing to

the plaintiff that he had agreed to purchase
from K. certain shares then held by K. in a company,
and that he had arranged to resell the shares at a
profit, induced the plaintiff to agree to assist him in
financing the transaction. For this purpose the plaintiff
drew a check on the C. bank payable to K. or order for
the amount of the purchase-money, which check was
delivered to W. in order that he might hand it to K. in
payment for the shares. W. forged K's indorsement to
the check and paid it into his own account with the dePerson."
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BILLS AND NOTES (Continued.)

fendant bank, who credited him with the amount, and
collected the money from the C. bank. W. had not agreed
to buy any shares from K., and K. had at the time no
shares in the company. In an action by the plaintiff
against the defendant bank for the conversion of the
check, it is held that as K. was an existing person designated by the plaintiff and intended by him to be the
payee of the check, the payee was not a "fictitious person" within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act
and that the defendant bank was liable to pay to the
plaintiff the amount of the check as damages for the
conversion. Compare Vinden v. Hughes, L. R. (1905)
i K. B., 795.
CARRIERS

In St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Fussell, 67
S. W., 332, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides
that while one who has a ticket and wilfully
Who Are
Passengers
refuses to pay fare is not a passenger, yet, if
he intends to pay fare and has the ability to do so, he
is entitled to a reasonable time to get the money after
demand, and does not become a trespasser on the very
instant of failure or refusal. See also Railway Co. v.
Bond, 62 Tex., 442.
In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stevens, 96 S.W., 888, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that an initial
carrier limiting its liability to its own line,
Baurden of
Proof
when sued for injuries to a shipment, has the
burden of showing that it carried the shipment with
proper care to the end of its line and there turned it over
to the connecting carrier. Compare Railroad Co. v.
Bourne, 29 S. W., 975.
The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Peru-Van Zandt Implement Co., 87 Pac., 8o,
that when a common carrier becomes liable
Lien for
Freight
to the consignee of goods for damages to the
property received in transit, and the amount of such
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damages equals or exceeds the freight bill on the damaged goods, the lien of the carrier is thereby extinguished,
and the consignee is entitled to the possession of such
goods without payment of freight; and in such a case
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods to the consignee
upon demand constitutes a conversion. See also Dyer
v. Grand Trunk R. R., 42 Vt., 441.

CONSPIRACY.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides
in Pickett et al. v. Walsh et al., 78 N. E., 753, that bricklayers' and masons' unions may lawfully
Trade
Unions
compete for the additional work of pointing
the buildings they construct in the exercise of their right
of competition, and may refuse to lay brick unless they
are given the Work of pointing them when laid, though
the contractors may prefer to give the work to regular
pointers, and though the effect of complying with the
union demands apparently will destroy the pointers'
business. Herewith compare March v. Bricklayers' &c.
Union, 63 Atl., 291.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The United States Supreme Court decides in Reuben
Hodges &c. v. United States, 27 S. C. R., 6, that Congress
Power of
was not empowered by the Thirteenth AmendCongess
ment to the United States Constitution to
make it an offense against the United States, cognizable
in the federal courts, for private individuals to compel
negro citizens, by intimidation and force, to desist from
performing their contracts of employment, but the remedy must be sought through state action and in state
tribunals, subject to the supervision of the . Supreme
Court of the United States by writ of error in proper
cases. Compare Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263.

PROGRESS

IIO

OF THE LAW.

CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas holds in Beal-Doyle
Dry Goods Co. et al. v. Barton, 97 S. W., 58, that though a
debtor was not guilty of any offense, and a
Legality of
Oblects
creditor did not intend to prosecute him criminally, yet, if the attorney of the creditor represented
to the father of the debtor that if he signed an obligation
guaranteeing the payment of the debt, the debtor would
not be prosecuted, and if he did not the debtor would be
prosecuted, the obligation executed by the father was
void. See in this connection Smith v. Steely, 8o Iowa,
738.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decides
in Harvey-Watts Co. et al. v. Worcester Umbrella Co., 78
Knowledge
N. E., 886, that where, in an action to charge
of offier

a director of a corporation with liability for

signing a false certificate that the capital stock had been
paid in cash, no vote by the directors to make a loan to
one of the subscribers for the amount of his subscription
was proved, such director could not be held liable merely
because he acted recklessly in swearing to the certificate,
if he was in fact ignorant of the loan. Compare Nash v.
Minnesota Title Ins. Co., 163 Mass., 574.
In Stewart et al. v. Wright,

147

Fed., 321, the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, decides
Torts of
Officers:
Liability

that where a banking corporation, knowing

that defendant B. and his associates were
engaged in a confidence game, assisted in

the furtherance of the scheme, both by representing to
the victims as they were brought in that B. was a man
of standing entitled to credit, and by lending B. banking
facilities with which alone he was enabled to conduct his
scheme and collect drafts, etc., drawn by the victims,
before payment could be stopped, and the other officers
of the bank themselves, with knowledge that the victims
were to be defrauded, drew drafts for such victims and
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CORPORATIONS (Continued.)

telegraphed to other banks to ascertain the victims'
responsibility, the bank as a corporation was liable as a
party to the scheme. The case is a very interesting and
elaborate discussion of the principles involved, and well
worthy of special study. Compare Hobbs v. Boatright,

93 S. W., 934.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in
Wyoming Coal Mining Co. et al. v. State ex rel. Kennedy,
87 Pac., 337, that where the by-laws of a
Inspection
of Books
corporation provided that the books and papers in the office or custody of the secretary and treasurer should be open at all times during business hours
to the inspection of stockholders, such by-law was effecttive to extend the stockholders' common-law right to
the examination of the corporation's books, without any
allegation or proof of fraud or mismanagement on the
part of the officers of the corporation. With this decision compare Swift v. Richardson, 7 Houst. (Del.), 338.
Against the dissent of one judge, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds in Farmers' Mut. Telephone Co. v. Howell,
corporate
Exstence

Io9 N. W., 294, that where a corporation had
been incorporated and doing business for

several years before defendant subscribed for his stock,
he could not defend an action on his subscription on the
ground that the corporation was not legally incorporated.
Compare Kansas City Co. v. Hunt, 57 Mo., 126.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas decides in
Crowder v. State, 96 S. W., 934, that where the owner of
Entrapment: mules, in order to detect a thief, employed
Theft
another person as detective to encourage the

thief's design and led him on-and the act was consummated, it was theft provided such owner or his agent did
not induce the original intent on the part of the thief.
See also Alexander v. State, 12 Tex., 544.
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DEEDS.

The Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. i, decides in Hornet v. Dumbeck, 78 N. E., 691, that.the rule
that where there are in a deed two descripElection by
Grantee
tions of the land conveyed which do not coincide, the grantee may elect that which is most favorable to him, does not apply where the grantee never made
an election between the conflicting descriptions nor took
possession with reference to one description to the exclusion of the other, and where it does not appear that either
description was more favorable than the other. Compare Harrisv. Oakley, 13o N. Y., i.
EVIDENCE.

In People v. Dolan, 78 N. E., 569, the Court of Appeals
of New York decides that on a trial for uttering a forged
note by indorsing it to a bank, evidence of
er
the forgery and uttering of other notes by
Forgeries
accused, made payable to him, and negotiated with other banks and individuals, was admissible
as showing guilty knowledge, especially where all the
notes were made at about the same time and during the
time accused was endeavoring to raise funds to meet his
obligations, and where in each case he used the names of
persons with whom he had done business and with whose
affairs he was familiar. Compare People v. Molineux,
i68 N. Y., 264; 62 L. R. A., 193.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota holds in Greenwald v. Ford, IO9 N. W., 516, that the fact that a signaComparison
ture, offered in evidence as a standard for
of
comparison, was made since the time of the
Hadwriing
signature in dispute may be considered
as

affecting its credibility, but it will not justify a denial
of its use, unless it is shown that it was manufactured
since the controversy arose, for the purpose of comparison, by one having a motive to fabricate. Compare
University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H., 163.
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FORGERY.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides in Norton v.
State, iog N. W., 531, that since a negotiable instrument
payable to the order of the payee may be
Essentials
transferred without his indorsement, it cannot be contended that a check falsely and fraudently
executed, though payable to another than the forger, is
without value in his hands so as to render its execution
not a forgery. Compare Esau v. Green, 94 Wis., 8.
In Rose v. State, 96 S. W., 996, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas decided that where defendant without any
authority signs his father's name to an order
Defences
and with it obtained money from a bank, he
was guilty of uttering and publishing a forged instrument,
though he believed that his father would pay the order
and not prosecute him. Compare Commonwealth v.
Butterick, ioo Mass., 17.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Hawes v. Glover, 55 S. E., 62, the Supreme Court of
Georgia decides that when a husband signs his wife's
name to a mortgage purporting to be exeWife's
Signature
cuted by her, in her immediate presence, and
by her express request and direction, the effect of such
signature is the same as if she had signed the mortgage
herself. The result of this decision seems to be to permit
the wife's interest in the land to be divested by oral
evidence, since her husband's authority is not proved by
any written instrument.
INJUNCTION.

Against the dissent of two judges the Supreme Court of
Georgia holds in Downing et al. v. Anderson, 55 S. E., 184,
Trespass

that before one claiming ownership of a tract
of land can maintain an action to enjoin the

cutting of timber thereon, it is incumbent upon him to
show that he has title to the land or is in possession there-
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INJUNCTION (Continued.)

of; and, if he relies upon possession alone as a basis for
the granting of the relief sought, it must be actual
possession of that portion of the land upon which the
wrong complained of is being committed. See also in
this connection the very recent decision of the same
Court in Hart v. Lewis, Shore & Co., 55 S. E., i89.
INNKEEPERS.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Walpert v.
Bohan, 55 S. E., 181, that if an innkeeper also conducts a
bathhouse on the seashore, where the general
conducting
Bathhouse
public, as well as guests at his inn, may obtain the use of bathrooms and accessories to the bath,
this is not sufficient to constitute the relation of innkeeper and guest between him and persons using such
bathhouse. The relation of the innkeeper in such case
is that of depositary for hire and he is liable for ordinary
negligence. Compare Bird v. Everard, 23 N. Y. Supp.,
io88.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Cavalierv. Pope, L. R. (19o6) A. C., 428, it appeared
that the owner of a dilapidated house contracted with
his tenant to repair it, but failed to do so.
Defective
Premises
The tenant's wife, who lived in the house and
was well aware of the danger, was injured by an accident
caused by the want of repair. Under these facts the
English House of Lords decides that- the wife being a
stranger to the contract, had no claim for damages against
the owner. With this decision compare I'ndermaur v.
Dames, L. R. i, C. P., 274.
MORTGAGES.

The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Moffet v. Farwell, 78 N. E., 925, that whether a merger results from
the uniting of the fee with a mortgage estate
Release by
Merger
in the same person, depends upon the intent
and interest of the parties. The presumption is that a
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merger was not intended by the grantee when the mortgage is essential to his security as against an intervening
title or lien, and such presumption is not overcome by
the fact that he cancelled and surrendered the notes and
mortgage. Compare Shippen v. Whittier, 117 Ill., 282.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In Johnson v. City of New York et al., 78 N. E., 715,
the Court of Appeals of New York decides that a specInjury from

tator voluntarily present to witness an auto-

mobile speed contest in a public highway cannot recover for an injury received by being struck by
an automobile swerving from its course and leaving the
highway, on the ground of the illegality of the contest,
but must prove negligence. It is held, however, that the
right of a spectator at an automobile speed contest in a
public highway to recover for injuries received by being
struck by an automobile swerving from its course and
leaving the highway, is not affected by the fact that he
stood on land adjacent to the highway, and was a trespasser thereon. See in this connection Platz v. City of
Cohoes, 89 N. Y., 219.
Automobile

NEGOTIATIONS.

In H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 1O9 N. W., 483, it
appeared that a petition for an injunction to restrain an
employe from working for a rival company
Contracts
for Personal alleged that she was employed to sell a frontServices
lace corset and to give lectures pertaining to
physical culture. The services were alleged to be unique,
requiring a cultured saleswoman of strong individuality,
with good address, and ability as a lecturer, which requirements respondent was alleged to meet in an exceptional
degree. It was not shown, however, that exceptional
talent was required to understand the corset, nor why any
other woman of intelligence and good address could not
perform the service. Under these facts the Supreme
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Court of Iowa decides that the petition alleged only the
failure of an experienced and competent saleswoman to
carry out her contract of employment and was not sufficient to sustain an injunction. Compare Philadelphia
Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa., 210.
RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Illinois decides in Chicago & E.
I. R. Co. v. People, 78 N. E., 784, that a railway compady
acting in good faith has the right, as against
Location of
Depot
the public, uncontrolled by contracts or previous acts on its part, to change the location of its depots,
provided it furnishes reasonably safe, accessible, and
convenient depot accomodations for the public, having
also regard to the interests of the stockholders of the
company. Compare People v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co., 130 Ill., 175.
RECORDS.

In Broadwell et al. v. Morgan, 55 S. E., 34o, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina holds that the recital in the body
of a grant from the state, as reported, of the

affixing of the seal of the state, is sufficient

evidence of its regularity, and the registry of the grant
is not invalidated because it does not appear of record
that a scroll or imitation of the great seal of the state
was copied thereon. Compare Aycock v. Railroad, 89 N.
C., 323.
SALES.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Trauerman
et al, v. Nebraska Land and Feeding Co., io9 N. W., 379,
that it is a rule generally enforced that a
Default of
Purchaser
purchaser, who has advanced money in part
performance of a contract, and who refuses to proceed,
the seller being ready and willing to peform on his part,
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cannot recover back the money so advanced; but to
subject the purchaser to this penalty or forfeiture it
should clearly appear that he has wholly abandoned the
contract and wilfully refused to proceed thereunder.
Compare Water v. Reed, 34 Neb., 544.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas holds in Zinc Co. v.
Patterson, 96 S. W., 170, that a contract for the installation of mining machinery, providing that
Umoire's
Decision
when tested it must be satisfactory to a certain named person, was valid and binding, though an
arbitrary and capricious expression of dissatisfaction
would not prevent the seller from recovering for the
machinery. See in this connection Hot Springs Ry. Co.
v. Maher 48 Ark., 522, 3 S. W., 639.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas, laying down the general rule in Moore v. Camden Marble & Granite Works,
Construction 96 S. W., io63, that an agreement to construct
an article especially for, or according to the
plans of, another, and not of a kind which the producer
usually has for sale in the course of his business, is a contract for work and labor, not within the statue of frauds,
though the transaction is to result in a sale of the article,
holds that a contract by one taking orders for completed
tombstones according to catalogue designs to construct
a tombstone according to a design and with an inscription selected by the patron, need not be in writing. Compare Lee v. Griffin, i B. & L., 272.
SUICIDE.

In May v. Pennell, 64 Atl., 885, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine decides that an attempt to commit suiAttempt to
Commt

cide is not an indictable offense in the State
of Maine. There is an interesting discussion

of the issue, though the result reached is not in all respects
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satisfactory. See in this connection Commonwealth v.
Mink, 123 Mass., 422.
TELEGRAPHS.

In Mott v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 55 S. E., 363,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina decides that time
Confictng
Dutle, of

opertors

consumed by a telegraph agent in attending

to his other duties as railroad agent, or in
handling the mail, does not operate as an

excuse for delay in the delivery of a telegram.
TELEPHONES.

In Shimzel v. Bell Telephone Co. of Philadelphia, 31
Pa. Super. Court, 221, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
decides that the erection of telephone poles
Damagesto
Landowner
and wires in city or borough streets, under
charter rights, with municipal consent, and in conformity to municipal regulations, is not in itself an additional
burden for which the owner of the fee is entitled to compensation. It follows from this, it is held, that unsightliness of the poles, and noises which are the ordinary
incident of the lawful and non-negligent maintenance
of the poles and wires and the conduct of the business,
do not constitute a special injury for which damages are
recoverable; but appreciable interference with light, air,
access or drainage is an additional burden to which the
land of the abutting owner cannot be subjected without
rendering to him just compensation. Compare Martachowski v. Orawitz, i4 Pa. Super. Ct., 175.
TORRENS TITLES.

In Baart v. Martin et al., lo8 N. W., 945, the Supreme

Court of Minnesota decides that when the registration of
the title to land is secured by fraud, and the
owner of the land is not notified, as required
by the statutes, the decree and the certificate of registration issued thereunder may be vacated and set aside,
Va'ating
Decre
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unless an innocent purchaser for value has obtained
rights on the faith of the record.
TRADE UNIONS.

In Denaby and Candeby Main Collieries, Ltd. v. Yorkshire Miners' Association et al., L. R. (i9o6) A. C., 384,
it appeared that a trade union had been sued
,Strike
for damages on the ground that workmen had
been induced to break their contracts with their employers
by officials of the union, and that the union had ratified
and adopted the acts of their officials. Under these facts
the English House of Lords decides that the union was
not liable, those who procured the strike not having been
authorized by the rules or by the action of the union.
The general rule is also laid down that where workmen
strike in breach of their contracts those who help to
maintain the strike by money and counsel are not liable to pay damages to the employers merely because
losses are thereby caused to the employers. See in connection with this important decision Yorkshire Miners'
Association v. Howden, L. R. (1905) A. C., 256.
TRESPASS.

In Wilson v. White et al., io9 N. W., 367, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska decides that several owners of animals
who have constituted of them a common or
JointLibity

joint herd, are jointly liable for trespasses

committed by such herd. Compare Jack v. Hundell,
Ohio St., 255.

25

WATERS AND WATER COURSES.

While there are numerous cases dealing with the
questions arising in consequence of the interference
of an upper riparian owner with the rights
R1paran
Rghts
of a lower riparian owner, it is seldom that
a case occurs where the situation is reversed. This
appears, however, in Alex. Pirie & Sons, Lt$. v.
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Earl of Kintore et al., L. R. (i9o6) A. C., 478,
where the facts were as follows: In 1882 mill-owners
on the Don river, which is a salmon river, increased their diversion of the water from its natural
channel into artificial channels serving the uses of
their mill. This was done to such an extent as to leave
the natural channel in the neighbourhood of the mill at
times bare of water. In i9oo the proprietors of the salmon fisheries in the upper reaches of the river objected
to the mill owners' diversion of the water, and asked for
an interdict. The decision of the House of Lords is that
they were entitled to an interdict, the principle being
laid down that interference with the free passage of salmon up a river is a wrong against the proprietors of the
upper fisheries, and if it materially obstructs the passage
of fish can be restrained by interdict. Compare with
this decision Menzies v. MacDonald, 16 D., 827.
WITNESSES.

In Hawes v. Glover, 55 S. E., 62, the Supreme Court of
Georgia decides that where one of the joint obligors upon
a promissory note gives a mortgage to secure
Competnctio
its payment, and, after his death, the holder
with Decedentof the note and mortgage
institutes a proceeding in the nature of a foreclosure of the mortgage, a
surviving co6bligor upon the note is a competent witness,
in such proceeding, to prove the execution of such mortgage, if, at the time he testifies, the note as to him has
become barred by the statue of limitations. Compare
Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga., 176.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides in Boyle et al.
v. Robinson, lO9 N. W., 623, that a physician who signed

a deed as a witness is competent to testify
with respect to the mental competency of
the grantor, where the answers of the physician involve
no disclosure of any communications received by him
while attending the grantor as a physician. Compare
IVinn v. Itzel, 125 Wis., 19.
Physician
and Patient

